Abstract-For the secure two-way communication and forwarding, this paper proposes SRDA, a secure routing and data aggregation approach for wireless smart meter. This approach introduces the unique wireless smart meter identifier to represent its public identity information, and gives a secure routing architecture based on control and forwarding separation. In this architecture, SRDA uses the proxy re-encryption data aggregation algorithm to protect security of data transmission. By using the routing algorithm according to distance and link quality, SRDA achieves the best routing path and provides several alternative paths which have different priorities. Besides, the identifier-based cryptography mechanism is used to issue and update the routing information in security, and the proxy reencryption mechanism is designed to preserve the data privacy. In conclusion, this paper gives an analysis for the relatively excellent security, scalability and energy efficiency.  Index Terms-Wireless smart meter identifier, secure routing and data aggregation, control and forwarding separation, identifier-based cryptography mechanism
I. INTRODUCTION
In the information system architecture of Smart Grid, Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is widely regarded as one of the most important components to develop Smart Grid [1] . As a key role in AMI, wireless smart meter is the major communication carrier for the customer and the power company [2] , and has become a new evolution direction for the smart power terminals. Different from the traditional power meter, the wireless smart meter not only has the basic metering function, but also provides with many smart functions [3] , including the multiple rate measurement, the remote control of electrical equipment, bidirectional data communication for multiple transmission modes, et al. However, with the development of information technology, there is an increasing consensus that for the large scale application of wireless smart meter it is necessary to resolve the network security problems [4] , [5] , which is also one important research content in the theory and technology of Smart Grid.
In AMI, wireless smart meter locates at the user end, so it may suffer from various forms of attacks. In general, Corresponding author email: wanming@sia.cn doi:10.12720/jcm.11.1.108-117 these attacks can be summarized into two aspects [6] : one is the attack aiming at the wireless smart meter, such as physical hardware attack ad illegal access; the other is the attack aiming at the two-way transmission network constructed by each wireless smart meter, for example data tampering and forging, Sinkhole, Sybil, et al. As the wireless technologies (e.g. Zigbee [7] and WIA-PA [8] ) have been successfully applied in wireless smart meter, the second aspect is considered particularly noteworthy. In practice, wireless smart meter network can be seen as a special kind of Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) [9] , which provides with the collection and interaction of power and status information. Generally, each sensor in WSN not only accomplishes the basic routing function, but also need to forward its neighbors' data. Because of the limited computing resources of each sensor, the routing protocol running in each sensor may suffer from kinds of threats at an easy rate [10] , [11] , and these threats can destroy the WSN's data interaction by utilizing the routing protocol directly or indirectly. As a particular WSN, wireless smart meter network also cannot escape from these security challenges. Furthermore, the attacks on the routing protocol may cause catastrophic consequences, and make the whole wireless smart meter network paralyzed in serious accidents. Besides, wireless smart meter network also uses the data aggregation algorithms for data transmission [12] . However, because of the open deployment and the broadcast characteristics, the data aggregation in wireless smart meter network is faced with a few huge security problems, such as the aggregation value forgery and aggregation result eavesdropping [13] . In order to resolve the secure routing and data aggregation problems in wireless smart meter network, this paper propose a secure routing and data aggregation approach named SRDA. Firstly, this approach gives the definition of the wireless smart meter identifier which represents the public identity information. Secondly, the identifier-based cryptography mechanism is descripted in detail, including the identifier-based encryption method, the identifier-based signature method and the identifierbased authentication method. Thirdly, SRDA proposes a secure and scalable routing architecture based on control and forwarding separation, and the routing algorithm according to distance and link quality is introduced to determine the best routing path and several alternative routing paths. In particular, SRDA uses the mentioned identifier-based cryptography mechanism to guarantee the secure routing and forwarding. Finally, in the proposed routing architecture, the detailed description on the proxy re-encryption data aggregation is provided for data transmission security.
II. RELATE WORK
In recent years, various new proposals on smart meter network security have been advanced in the literatures. Reference [14] presents an overview of relevant cyber security and privacy issues in Smart Grid, and concludes that almost every aspect related to IT technology in the smart grid has potential vulnerabilities due to inherent security risks in the general IT environment. Focusing on the smart meter, Reference [15] reviews a generic model for the Smart Grid, and presents possible attacks and countermeasures from several aspects including confidentiality, integrity, availability and non-repudiation. Considering various security vulnerabilities of deploying AMI, Reference [16] proposes an efficient security protocol called Integrated Authentication and Confidentiality (IAC) to provide trust services, data privacy, and integrity by mutual authentications whenever a new smart meter initiates and joins the AMI network.
About the secure routing, Reference [17] provides a comprehensive security mechanism for source routing protocol in wireless multi-hop networks, which is particularly suitable for multi-dwelling environment. In [18] , a new trust-based geographical routing protocol, named as Dynamic Trust Elective Geo Routing (DTEGR) is implemented. DTEGR uses the trust factor with a dynamic threshold value to generate a trust forwarding list, and then uses distance factor as routing metric to decide the next hop from the trust forwarding list. In addition, considering wireless mesh AMI network with mobile repeaters, Reference [19] proposes an efficient and robust security mechanism for the wireless multi-hop mesh AMI network that uses multipath routing protocol, and the proposed security mechanism is capable of providing end-to-end security.
About the secure data aggregation, Reference [20] advises all smart meters are involved to construct an information aggregation tree, and homomorphic encryption is used to secure the data aggregation. Especially, each wireless smart meter cannot find out any intermediate or final aggregation results. For user-related privacy preservation, References [21] and [22] propose a security architecture for distributed aggregation of smart metering data, and it collects the data and provides communication and cryptographic capabilities by relying on Gateways placed at the customers' premises. In order to resist impersonation and false data injection attacks, Reference [23] proposes an efficient and secure data aggregation scheme which is aimed to provide early detection of impersonation and false data injection attacks using hop-by-hop security, thus minimizing the need to rely entirely on the end receiver for verification.
III. DESIGN DETAILS OF SRDA

A. Wireless Smart Meter Identifier
In order to safeguard the identity authenticity, we define the unique identifier for each wireless smart meter to represent its public identity information. As shown in Fig. 1 , the wireless smart meter basically consists of two parts: the user account and the smart meter number. Furthermore, the user account is a unique identification number which is assigned by the electric power marketing system, and the smart meter number is an internal identifier, which is recorded in the memory of each smart meter. Besides, the wireless smart meter identifier can be expressed by a string of characters or a string of numbers or some combination of both. 
B. Identifier-Based Cryptography Mechanism
Aiming at ensure the confidentiality and authentication of two-way communication in wireless smart meter network, we propose the identifier-based cryptography mechanism, which comes from Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC) [24] . The identifier-based cryptography mechanism uses the wireless smart meter identifier as the public key, and generates the corresponding private key by the Private Key Generator (PKG). Therefore, this mechanism can simplify the key management and distribution in public key cryptosystem. The identifier-based cryptography mechanism mainly includes three significant parts: the identifier-based encryption method, the identifier-based signature method and the identifier-based authentication method.
Identifier-based encryption method: as shown in Fig. 2 , the completed process of the identifier-based encryption method is the following: Step 1: Generating system parameters. The trusted third party PKG is responsible to generate the whole system parameters, including the master key mk and the public parameters params. In particular, the master key mk is confidential, and the public parameters params is published and distributed to each wireless smart meter.
Step 2: Extracting the wireless smart meter private key. By using the master key mk, the public parameters params and the wireless smart meter identifier ID sm , PKG extracts the corresponding private key K sm for each wireless smart meter, as depicted in (1).
(1) Here, ExtractSMKey is the private key extracting algorithm.
Step 3: Data encryption. By using the public parameters params and the receiver's identifier ID sm , the sender can encrypt the plaintext M sm into the cipertext C sm , as shown in (2).
(2) Here, EncryptSM is the encryption algorithm.
Step 4: Data decryption. When the receiver has acquired the cipertext C sm , the receiver can decrypt the cipertext C sm , into the original plaintext M sm by using its own private key K sm and he public parameters params, as depicted in (3). Step 1: Generating system parameters. The trusted third party PKG is responsible to generate the whole system parameters, including the master key mk and the public parameters params. In particular, the master key mk is confidential, and the public parameters params is published and distributed to each wireless smart meter.
Step 2: Extracting the wireless smart meter private key. By using the master key mk, the public parameters params and the wireless smart meter identifier ID sm , PKG extracts the corresponding private key K sm for each wireless smart meter.
Step 3: Digital Signature. By using the public parameters params and the sender's private key K sm , the sender can digitally sign the plaintext M sm , and generate the signature sig, as shown in (4) .
Here, SignSM is the digital signature algorithm.
Step 4: Signature verification. When the receiver has acquired the plaintext M sm and the signature sig, the receiver can verify the signature sig by using the sender's identifier ID sm and the public parameters params, as depicted in (5) .
(5) Here, VerifySM is the signature verification algorithm, and d is the verification result (True or False).
Identifier-based authentication method: This method adopts the challenge-response approach to achieve the double-way authentication between the wireless smart meters. Fig. 4 describes the process of double-way authentication, and the specific interaction procedures are the following:
Step 1: when one wireless smart meter SM1 wants to associate with another wireless smart meter SM2, SM1 first sends a request authentication message AuReq, mainly including: the current timestamp T sm1 generated automatically by SM1, the wireless smart meter identifier ID sm1 of SM1 and the signature Sig sm1 {T sm1 , ID sm1 } for the fields of T sm1 and ID sm1 .
Step 2: after SM2 receives the message AuReq, it first checks the validity of the timestamp T sm1 , and then verifies the signature Sig sm1 {T sm1 , ID sm1 } by using SM1's public key ID sm1 . If both of them are correct, SM2 can confirm the identity of SM1is authentic. Afterward, SM2 constructs and sends the response message AuAck, mainly including: the current timestamp T sm2 generated automatically by SM2, the wireless smart meter identifier ID sm2 of SM2 and the signature Sig sm2 {T sm2 , ID sm2 } for the fields of T sm2 and ID sm2 .
Step 3: when SM1 receives the message AuAck, it checks the validity of the timestamp T sm2 and the signature Sig sm2 {T sm2 , ID sm2 }. If correct, SM1 can confirm the identity of SM2 is authentic. Above all, SM1 and SM2 accomplish the double-way authentication.
SM1 SM2
AuReq：Tsm1, IDsm1, Sigsm1{Tsm1, IDsm1}
AuAck：Tsm2, IDsm2, Sigsm2{Tsm2, IDsm2} 
C. Secure Routing Architecture Based on Control and
Forwarding Separation Based on Software-defined Network (SDN) technology [25] , the wireless smart meter network is decoupled into two parts: control plane and data plane. Furthermore, control plane gives the network control decision through the global network view, and then directly sends it to data plane. According to the network control decision, data plane only accomplishes the data forwarding function. Described above, the SDN provides with a new routing architecture of logic control and data forwarding separation. As shown in Fig. 5 , wireless smart meter network consists of different control domains, and each control domain has a controller which owns the network topology of all wireless smart meters in this domain. By using the Publish/Subscribe pattern, the controllers in different domains synchronize the whole network topology. Besides, the controller calculates the best routing path between each wireless smart meter and the data concentrator, and sends this path information to each wireless smart meter which belongs to the best routing path. Therefore, the wireless smart meter is not responsible for the lookup and update of the routing information, and only carries out some work to collect and forward the power consumption or control command. For example, when a wireless smart meter wants to join into some control domain, it first authenticates with the corresponding controller the identifier-based signature and authentication method, and then sends some information encrypted with the controller's public key to the controller, including the channel, transmitting power, signal strength, adjacent node, et al. When the controller decrypts the information with its own private key, the controller adds the wireless smart meter into the network topology. After that, by using the routing algorithm according to the distance and link quality, the controller calculates the best routing path of this wireless smart meter and sends it to each wireless smart meter belonging to this path.
The procedure of the routing algorithm according to distance and link quality is the following: Firstly, the controller use the shortest path routing algorithm to calculate n relatively short paths from some wireless smart meter to the data concentrator; Secondly, the controller calculates the each path's routing cost based on the link quality [26] , which is described by the packet reception rate or the received signal strength; At last, according to the routing cost, the controller finds out the best routing path which has the optimum link quality. As shown in Fig. 5 , the controller can provide one or more backup routing paths for each wireless smart meter, and the wireless smart meter can choose another backup path immediately when the best routing path is ineffective. After the controller find out the best routing path, it also select several alternative routing paths for each wireless smart meter. According to the different routing costs of all alternative routing paths, the controller sets different priorities to each alternative routing path: the larger the routing cost is, the lower the priority is. Furthermore, the controller informs the corresponding wireless mart meter of these alternative routing paths and priorities. Therefore, when the routing path which has high priority is effective, the wireless smart meter can choose the routing path whose priority is a little lower to transmit data.
D. Proxy Re-Encryption Data Aggregation Algorithm
In the secure routing architecture, according to the distance and link quality, the controller chooses the appropriate proxies for data aggregation in each control domain, and the proxies include two parts: inter-domain proxy and intra-domain proxy. As shown in Fig. 6 , the proxy re-encryption data aggregation algorithm uses the domain/tree mixed information aggregation method, which constructs an information aggregation tree with all control domains according to the domain level. Furthermore, the nearer the logic distance from the data concentrator is, the higher the domain level is. In general, the intra-domain proxy or inter-domain proxy is the wireless smart meter in the best routing path: the intradomain proxy is responsible for information aggregation of data transmission in the same control domain, and the inter-domain proxy takes charge of information aggregation of data transmission between different control domains. The proxy re-encryption data aggregation algorithm introduces the identifier-based proxy re-encryption mechanism, and its basic principle is as follows: when a wireless smart meter sends the power or status information to the data concentrator, it first generates its own proxy re-encryption key, and then encrypts the transmission data with its wireless smart meter identifier. After that, it forwards the proxy re-encryption key and the encrypted data to the intra-domain proxy. When the intra-domain proxy receives these messages from different wireless smart meters, it first aggregates the data, and re-encrypts the aggregation result with each proxy reencryption key (Here, accomplish one aggregation reencryption process). Through the information aggregation tree, the encrypted aggregation result can be transmitted up to the inter-domain proxy. After another aggregation re-encryption process by the inter-domain proxy, the final aggregation result can be sent to the data concentrator. Finally, the data concentrator decrypts the final aggregation result with its own private key, and gets the power or status information belonging to lots of different wireless smart meters.
The identifier-based proxy re-encryption mechanism mainly includes three important parts: proxy reencryption key generation, data re-encryption and data decryption. The primary process is the following:
Step 1: Generating the proxy re-encryption key. By using the wireless smart meter identifier ID sm , the wireless smart meter private key K sm , and the data concentrator identifier ID con , the wireless smart meter generates the proxy re-encryption key RK sm->con for each intra-domain proxy or inter-domain proxy, as depicted in (6) .
RK sm->con <-RKGen(K sm , ID sm , ID con ) (6) Here, RKGen is the proxy re-encryption key generating algorithm.
Step 2: Data re-encryption. When the intra-domain proxy or inter-domain proxy receives the cipertext C sm from some wireless smart meter, it can re-encrypt the cipertext C sm into the new cipertext C con by using the proxy re-encryption key RK sm->con , as depicted in (7).
Here, Reencrypt is the re-encryption algorithm.
Step 3: Data decryption. When the data concentrator receives the new cipertext C con , it can decrypt the cipertext C con into the the original plaintext M sm by using its own private key K con , as depicted in (8) .
Here, DecryptService is the decryption algorithm.
IV. QUALITATIVE EVALUATION
A. Security
Double-way Authentication: In wireless smart meter network, any two wireless nodes including the wireless smart meters and the controllers can achieve the doubleway authentication by using the identifier-based authentication method. So the proposed routing approach can guarantee the identity authenticity of each wireless node.
Confidentiality:
In data communication, the transmitted and received messages, including the power consumption, the control command, the lookup and update of the routing information et al., can be encrypted by using the identifier-based encryption method. So the proposed routing approach can guarantee the confidentiality of data communication.
Non-repudiation: When the wireless smart meters send the power information or the controllers publish the routing information, the transmission data can be signed by using the identifier-based signature method. So SRDA can guarantee the non-repudiation of information transmission.
Uniqueness: In SRDA, each wireless smart meter has the unique identifier to represent its public identity information. In other words, any two wireless smart meters cannot have the same identifier, so the identity of each wireless smart meter is unique.
Privacy Protection: Data privacy concerns the security of data which are related to the life of individuals. The problem of privacy protection is intrinsic in wireless smart meter, because it can reveals a lot of information about residential usage when the data is collected and forwarded [5] . The proxy re-encryption data aggregation algorithm can provide the privacy protection when the critical data is aggregated and transmitted, that is because any wireless smart meter in the transmission path cannot get the plaintext from the encrypted data.
B. Scalability
SRDA is based on the SDN technology which separates control from the forwarding plane. As illustrated in [27] , decoupling data and control planes can bring scalability advantage. In our secure routing architecture, the wireless smart meter is only responsible for data forwarding, and the controller take charge of routing calculation. Therefore, one wireless smart meter can easily join to or leave from the control domain, and no too big change appears in the network topology or the whole network performance. Besides, without routing calculation the wireless smart meter can save some computing resources, and these computing resources may be utilized to associate with more wireless smart meters. From Reference [28] we can see that on an eight-core machine with 2GHZ CPUs, a controller can handles 1.6 million requests per second with an average response time of 2ms. So a single controller is enough to manage a sizeable network, for example a residential area owing thousands of customers can only use one controller. For the large-scale development, the controller may use highperformance equipment, and the structure of all controllers can be distributed or based on cloud computing.
C. Energy Efficiency
SRDA has a good effect on the energy saving, and the main reasons include three aspects:
Firstly, the idea on control and forwarding separation is introduced to the proposed routing architecture, and the wireless smart meter need not accomplish the routing calculation. Therefore, it can save lots of computing resources and energy.
Secondly, the data aggregation in SRDA can remove some useless information, and simplify the transmission data. So it can save the energy which is wasted in the data transmission process.
Finally, in SRDA, we use the identifier-based cryptography mechanism and the identifier-based proxy re-encryption mechanism, and both of them come from Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC). Furthermore, the energy consumption of these mechanisms is lightweight, and is less than other cryptosystems, such as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
V. SECURITY VERIFICATION
In this section, we use attack graph to verify the security of SRDA. Attack graph [29] , [30] , based on model, is an effective security analysis method, and it can analyze network vulnerabilities by researching on the mutual relationship between different weaknesses. According to network topology, status and vulnerability, attack graph can construct a directed graph to present all attack paths from the starting point to destination. In brief, attack graph contains various attack ways and their dependencies which may be utilized by the attacker to destroy the target system. Attack graph is composed by nodes and directed edges, and the nodes include two types: the attribute nodes and the atomic attack nodes. Moreover, the attribute nodes can be regarded as some critical information, such as network topology, host status and the attacker's ability, and the atomic attack nodes represent the basic attacks launched by the attackers by using the network or host vulnerabilities. Therefore, the formal description of attack graph can be expressed as ( , , ) G A T E  . Here, A is the set of attribute nodes, T is the set of atomic attack nodes, and E is the set of directed edges.
As defined in [30] , we use the expected loss to analyze network security quantitatively. Because an attack sequence is formed by a group of attribute nodes and atomic attack nodes, we suppose that one attack sequence A is i L and the total expected loss value is R . Based on the success probability of each attribute node, we can calculate the total expected loss value as
In order to verify the security of SRDA, we depict the attack graph of the man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack as an example to compare the expected losses between our SRDA architecture and the general WSN. As known to all, the MITM attack is a very common attack behavior in WSN [31] , [32] . Generally, the attacker pretends a "kind" host which is located on the communication path of two victims, and eavesdrops or tampers the corresponding communication information. When one attacker wants to launch the MITM attack to the victims V a and V b , it needs to satisfy the following precondition: the attacker must hide in the communication path between V a and V b . So, when the attacker has known the location information of the victims, the attacker can change his position and make itself located on this path. Based on the above precondition, we can define the MITM's attribute nodes and atomic attack nodes as follows:
1) Attribute node description (1) Loc(V x )={0,1} indicates whether the attacker has known the location information of the victim V x . Here, 1 represents yes, and 0 represents no. Because the attacker usually collect the location information before launching the MITM attack, the initial value of Loc(V x ) is 1. According to the definitions of the above attribute nodes, atomic attack nodes and the attribute transformation caused by the atomic attacks, we traverse all attribute nodes and atomic attack nodes, and connect the different nodes with the directed edges. Finally, we draw the attack graph of the MITM attack, shown in Above all, according to Equation (9) , the expected loss of the MITM attack in general WSN is 2 3
In our SRDA architecture, we give the same assumptions. On one hand, the success probability of the atomic 
Because there are the same attribute transformation between two architectures, we premise that 
In order to compare the security more precisely, we define the loss ratio of two architectures as wsn SRDA r R R 
. Fig. 8 depicts the loss ratio's change when the number of wireless smart meters in the whole network is from 10 to 110. From this figure, we can see that as the number of wireless smart meters increases, the loss ratio becomes larger. Moreover, the loss ratio is always larger than 1. Namely, the expected loss WSN R is larger than the expected loss SRDA R . Fig. 9 shows the loss ratio's change when the impact factor is from 0.1 to 1. As shown in Fig. 9 , when the impact factor increases, the loss ratio decreases. However, the loss ratio is also larger than 1. Besides, from these two figures, we can also conclude that the more the number of the communication paths between V a and V b is, the less the loss ratio is. So we should reduce the number the communication paths between V a and V b as far as possible. Through the above analysis, we can draw a conclusion that the expected loss in the general WSN is always larger than the one in our SRDA architecture. That is to say, the SRDA architecture provides better security. In this paper, we propose SRDA, a secure routing and data aggregation approach for wireless smart meter, and describe the detailed design solution. Furthermore, we first give the definition of the wireless smart meter identifier, which represents the public identity information. And then, we present the identifier-based cryptography mechanism. Once again, we explain the detailed design on the secure routing architecture based on control and forwarding separation. Finally, in the proposed routing architecture, the detailed description on the proxy re-encryption data aggregation is provided for data transmission security. The evaluations show that, SRDA has relatively fine security, scalability and energy efficiency. 
